This confuses me
This morning while browsing over at the TPM Cafe (see, I read liberal blogs too, not just libertarian) I was a tad surprised and very confused by a Matthew Yglesias post:
Canada's ruling-but-embattled Liberal Party has come out in favor of eliminating their constitution's "notwithstanding clause," a rarely used provision that permits the parliament to override judicial decisions about their Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I think the notwithstanding clause is a good thing (see Scott Lemieux for reasoning) and would be disappointed to see our friends to the north lose one of their more admirable constitutional quircks and instead start slogging down the American path where we're forced to endure judicial confirmation hearings that are both incredibly consequential and mind-bogglingly tedious.
Now I'm no fan of the judicial confirmation farce, but is he serious about this notwithstanding clause thing? Intrigued, I looked a little (not a lot) deeper. Based on my cursory snooping, it seems that the notwithstanding clause does, in fact, allow parliament (or even provincial parliaments) to override judicial decisions for a period of up to 5 years (can be renewed). Needless to say, I was surprised that Matt would come out in favor of a clause that, if applied in America, would seem to give state legislators veto power over federal court decisions. Surely, I thought, I must be mistaken. The more I looked, though, that seems to be just what the notwithstanding clause does.
Well maybe, I thought, Matt didn't think about it being applied at the provincial (or state) level. No:
[I]t's my understanding that the notwithstanding clause has a lot of implications for Quebec where the provincial legislature has invoked it several times in order to keep various restrictions on the use of the English language in place.
What sort of restrictions? Well, one "famous" example I found occurred in 1989 when,
The premier of Quebec employed the "notwithstanding clause" to override
freedom of expression (section 2b), and equality rights (section 15). This
allowed Quebec to continue the restriction against the posting of any commercial
signs in languages other than French. (from the Wikipedia entry linked above)
Now I know the folks in Quebec treasure their French roots, but how is this any different from John C. Calhoun's infamous nullification argument or Judge Roy's Rock? I know I have the tendency to be cantankerous just for the sake of argument, but I really do not see the difference here. In fact, Matt himself speculates that the current argument about the clause is driven by the furor over gay marriage. Yet, he still comes out in favor of it? I know the "liberal judiciary" very often is exaggerated and vilified in the U.S., but I thought many of the advances and improvements in American society that liberals are (justifiably) most proud of were achieved through the federal court system. True, Matt is not as "far left" as many at TPM, but I'm really troubled by this.
Again, I'm certainly no legal scholar, so I really hope I'm just missing something here. Hey, Vol, I understand the Canadian system is based, in large part, on the English system. Does the Vol-in-Law have any familiarity with this sort of clause? Is it one of those legal things I just don't understand that really enhances rights rather than restrict them? Someone please tell me I'm wrong about this whole notwithstanding clause.
I hope it's not the case, but a cynic might think Matt's approval of the clause comes from a sentiment like that expressed at Liberalism without Cynicism:
[J]udicial supremacy is an American institution, not a Canadian one. The Canadian system is based on Parlimentary supremacy, not on "checks and balances" between the legislature, executive and courts. Martin's proposed constitutional amendment would make Canada more American, not less. (Italics in original.)
Opposing the removal of this clause simply because it would make Canada more like America seems to be a stupid, knee jerk reaction. But that's just me.
1 Comments:
The UK has the "supremacy of Parliament" doctrine - courts aren't supposed to be able to overrule the clearly expressed will of Parliament. This doctrine has been negated to some extent by membership of the EU, since the EU claims law-making supremacy, but there is no real English common-law concept of judicial restraint on the legislature.
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